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CHAL-0031-0
Copy 5 of 8

13 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Operations Branch, DFD
THROUGH : Chief, Administrative Branch, DFD
SUBJECT : Security Of CHALICE Field Operations

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1. In keeping with your request for comments concerning security factors to be taken into account when planning CHALICE missions, the undersigned made a number of verbal observations to [redacted]. This is forwarded to record the points covered.

(a) It was suggested that the mission check sheet be prepared in such form as to permit a post-critique of the operation. This would permit subsequent staff review to identify mistakes and outline remedial action. It is suggested, in addition, that a similar mission check sheet be prepared at Headquarters, USAF, USAFE, and at the base. This would provide Headquarters, for the first time, with a comprehensive accounting of all actions taken during a mission and would serve as a valuable basis for improvements in our method of operation.

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(b) It was recommended that a more comprehensive briefing of support crews be afforded in order to preclude unnecessary communications between Air Force components as to relative areas of responsibility such as have occurred during past operations. It is believed that the briefing of the support aircraft commanders by [redacted] was a significant step in this direction.

(c) It is also recommended that flight clearance and visa arrangements for support crews be accomplished in such a manner as to be diversionary. I have in mind that much of the communications traffic related to these matters is in the clear. Communications intercept, in addition to such indicators as the opposition may possess, could put together a significant pattern of operation.

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(e) Concerned with communication is the level of or relationship of traffic that might demonstrate our interest in a particular operational base. I am sure you agree that prior traffic should be curtailed in order to reduce the possibility of disclosing interest in a specific area.

(f) The same reasoning applies to prepositioning of equipment. It was recommended, insofar as operationally possible, teams should be self-contained and carry supplies with them.

2. The policy of limited dissemination of knowledge of forthcoming operations is certainly commendable. The undersigned feels obligated, however, to caution against too strict an application within DPD lest we deprive ourselves of the full usage of necessary personnel. Presumably, within DPD, there is the least possibility of penetration. It is in the areas of coordination with other Government components to effect political, logistical and communications support, that the operation is most vulnerable. It is in these areas that the DPD personal control factor is lost. What is suggested is that we do not deny ourselves the valuable services of DPD personnel to effect an illusion of security, when examination would indicate other significant areas of vulnerability.

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Security Officer
DPD-DO/P

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LFM/ak